Civilian Graduate Education and the Professional Officer

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THE ERA since World War II has witnessed tremendous challenges to the traditional perception of military professionalism. What was once an endeavor largely isolated from society, at least in peacetime, has grown into national security. Due to its expanded roles of civic action and political involvement, the military can no longer stand apart from society. Intervention and peacekeeping (PK) roles in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia underscore that the officer-leader is now both manager and bureaucrat. Internally, there are new mechanisms to manage human and materiel resources. Externally, the military is inextricably involved with policy making at the highest national levels. Internationally, there are no military actions without political ramifications.

Professional military education—from West Point to the senior schools and war colleges—is not sufficient to develop officers cognitively able to deal with these new nonmilitary tasks without compromising military professionalism. The depth of insight and inquiry needed is best found in civilian liberal arts graduate education, in contrast to technical and scientific graduate degrees. Although traditionalists may contend that graduate school detracts from professionalism, such study enhances the profession and enables the officer to better carry out long-term military obligations.

This article may serve as a companion to the seminal volume, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Fred B. Bryant.[1] References to Mel Sorg's and Bryant's analyses herein refer to this volume. I hope to convey a better understanding of the current status of the professional officer, as well as what will be expected of him as the United States enters the 21st century.

If the military is to function in the international and domestic socio-political environments with their diverse and complex challenges, officers must be prepared in a way that cannot be accomplished solely by PME. Civilian liberal arts study gives an officer the best perspective from which to serve his client—the nation and the society it represents: "The educated military man, skilled in his own profession, and unafraid to commit himself to higher principles, provides the best safeguard to civilian control and a democratic system."

Leadership versus Management

The management of violence and successful combat leadership, which had been the hallmarks of the military profession before World War II, were no longer sufficient to characterize the totality of the profession as the United States progressed through the 1940s. The traditional functions of officers were modified in two broad ways. First, there was greater concern with international affairs and the premises and purposes of military policy. Second, military support functions became more important, encompassing supply, finance, research and development, public relations, education and personnel management. Especially in noncombat assignments, the career of the skilled military technician began to parallel that of a federal civil servant.[2]

From an international security standpoint, author Morris Janowitz presents the concept of a constabulary force designed to promote deterrence, stability and the limited use of force because "it is increasingly essential for military commanders and their subordinate personnel . . . to be fully aware of the changing calculus of making war and making peace."[3] Janowitz contends that the contemporary officer must relate national policy to the military organization. This means acting with minimal force and incorporating a protective posture while

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seeking viable international relations. To assume international policing and PK responsibilities, the postwar officer needs an understanding of national policy and objectives, which demands a broader scope of "citizen attachment"—that is, closer ties to society and state.

As to internal military matters and support functions, Sarkesian and Taylor refer to "dual professionalism," which places "peacetime soldiering" alongside the traditional management of violence. The idea of civilian-style management has pervaded the officer corps since the late 1940s, reaching its acme during Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's tenure. Indeed, one of the earliest postwar treatments of the military establishment was titled *Military Management for National Defense*. Another author refers to the "development of Army comptrollership," citing "businessmen in uniform." Yet another writer distinguishes between the management of violence—commanding a rifle company—and the act of violence—firing a rifle. Another author adds, "No longer is the leader always the most skilled soldier; today the technical skills of followers may well exceed those of the leader. . . . Nevertheless, followers seem to expect more from their leaders today," alluding to personnel and resource management functions.[4]

Taking these new international and organizational responsibilities into account, authors John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway have constructed three categories of qualifications that all officers should meet:

- Professional military qualifications, which consist of military competence, the representation of the national security viewpoint in a democratic society and knowing the problems of enlisted personnel.
- General executive qualifications, which include the evaluation of people and information, effective communications and the efficient and economic conduct of affairs. Here the officer must be able to grasp large and complicated situations. Seeing military affairs' "big picture" means making cognitive connections among—and balancing—its diverse components. Technical, organizational and social relationships must be discerned here. This requires some degree of socio-political sophistication. The professional military executive must adapt to political and technical situations while reviewing the service's traditions, doctrines and missions.[5] The postwar officer must be aware of the joint and international nature of military planning and operations and be free from parochialism. This openness extends from the avoidance of service bias to politico-military interchange with allies.
- Military executive qualifications of versatility, exercise of job motivation and creative service under civilian leadership. A military executive must possess a wide range of knowledge and be able to absorb new data and concepts quickly. Also, he leads his charges mainly through patience and intellectual leadership. Persuasion, not orders, is seen as the best motivational strategy. Finally, a contemporary officer obeys his civilian superiors and brings his best judgment as a military expert to bear on civilian policy decisions.

Masland and Radway end by addressing the issue of the military executive versus the combat leader. They conclude that field and headquarters situations probably grow more alike as responsibilities increase. To capitalize on this, they propose a good military education system, as well as a rotation designed to enhance an officer's adaptability.[6]

Not all observers, however, embrace the managerial ethos of the US officer corps. For instance, Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage make an

especially scathing indictment of the Army officer corps in light of its performance in Vietnam, noting that the military is qualitatively different from civilian bureaucracies, with the former being monastic and corporate, and the latter entrepreneurial: "In the final analysis, no one is seriously expected to allow his loyalty to IBM to cost him his life or to force him to bear the responsibility for the death of others."[7] Traditional military values and experiences center on combat. Further, they allege there are too many managers in the Army today and not enough good combat officers. Models of military organizational change must take this into account. Gabriel and Savage urge the Army to abandon the entrepreneurial ethos and return to its core values.

Some have taken this point further by noting the debilitating effects of the managerial ethos on officers' attitudes toward their careers, referring to the new military careerism as "trained incapacity" and "professional deformation." Especially among staff officers, *personal* career goals begin to outweigh military interests and objectives. Savage also recommends a move away from the managerial officer to the traditional officer more concerned with leadership than with resource management.[8]

Others are not absolutist concerning the place of management in the military. James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves note that the postwar growth of defense spending calls for improved procedures and techniques to manage the military at all levels of command. They add that professional military schools, in addition to strictly military studies, correctly stress national security policy, international relations, personnel and fiscal management and individual skills such as writing, speaking and negotiation. These skills may be even more necessary in the climate of post-Cold War defense cuts.

Maintaining that today's military needs both leadership and management, several authors suggest that education early in an officer's military career emphasize leadership development, along with management skills to inculcate efficiency. Later, an officer should have executive-level leadership training for goal definition and the establishment of organizational climate, alongside management skills for resource allocation.

Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach further refine the notion of leadership versus management. Leadership emanates from the personal qualities of the officer, while management is the process of using tools and techniques to effectively and efficiently deploy resources. In the broadest sense, resources include time, information, money and people. These authors also maintain that the postwar military needs both leadership and management qualities to carry out its diverse missions and tasks.[9]

Every professional—military or civilian—must have an intellectual awareness of the world outside his profession. The military professional must have the intellectual sensitivity to assess the use of force, policy outcomes and the domestic and international environment. As Masland and Radway note, "high-level command and policy-making responsibilities are not those for which a neatly packaged bundle of requirements can be determined and assembled. They call for the broadest sort of intellectual and personal qualities."

The Postwar Professional

Former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor once characterized the Army as an institution "more like a church." Indeed, the "military" components of military professionalism, such as honor, obedience, integrity, loyalty and service, are not typically associated with other organizations. The military is not a corporate bureaucracy, but a value-infused institution with a long history. Military life is holistic, characterized by Gabriel and Savage as a "monastery" in terms of its values, rewards and punishments by one's peers. It is "an institution which requires deep psychic investment from its members as a prerequisite to effectiveness." The military's identity and its relationship with society and state are determined by the officer corps, which strives to be more than a body of trained killers, acting as the repository of loyalty, gentlemanly conduct, corporateness, responsibility and expertise.[10]

However, the postwar officer corps must transcend this traditional definition of professionalism. No longer is the officer just a professional soldier, but a bureaucrat as well. Leadership now includes influencing both civilian and military people, goal achievement in a political-cultural setting that mitigates exclusively military solutions, the study of interpersonal relations and group dynamics and understanding American liberal democratic values. As John W. Gardner observed, "if anything significant is to be accomplished, leaders must understand the social institutions and processes through which action is carried out."[11]

By 1953, two-thirds of Army general officers were already carrying out economic, scientific and political assignments. Combat operations had become—and remain—only a fraction of Armed Forces activity. Masland and Radway noted:

Externally, in the domestic political environment, both civilians and military professionals have recognized the need to have the military involved in the policy process: "With the traditions of obedience to civilian control strong within the military, with an appreciation by military leaders of the spirit of the democratic system, and with competent civilian superiors determined to exercise effective civilian control, the costs of a broadened military professionalism do not appear too high. The benefits of military advice given after a consideration of all relevant factors should contribute to more enlightened national security policy."

"Obviously, very few officers in these [nonmilitary] positions have much to do with matters of high national policy. But each stands at the base of a pyramid that reaches up to heights on which other military officers, by conference, staff study and directive, help dispose of pressing national business." As the 1950s progressed, completing a decade of the postwar military, officers' roles continued to be transformed due to technical advances and the informal federalism of Western democracies. This was important not only for the sake of military administration and preparedness, but also for deterrence and peacekeeping in the nuclear context. They concluded: "If, in the future, total war means total annihilation, it follows axiomatically that any officer corps that manages to survive will do so only because war has been avoided or because it has been severely limited in purpose and scope."[12] The limitation in purpose and scope includes cooperation between officers and diplomats.

Officers have become involved in psychology, civil affairs and international security policy, as well as fighting drug trafficking and, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, racism. Technology, specialization and social changes have posed moral, philosophical and ideological challenges to military traditions. This, in turn, has led to modified officer education and career patterns. While some have criticized these activities in nonmilitary fields, others contend that military involvement in social welfare, education and civic action is needed to sustain professional purpose as much as preparing for, and waging, war. The military profession cannot be limited to the management of violence, for this is not always a relevant or viable option. When an institution loses its function, it must either find a new one or disappear. The military, though slow to change, has done so. Recognizing this, Amos A. Jordan formulated a new military vocation definition: "The management and application of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping and combat roles in the context of rapid technological, social and political change."[13]

Contrary to popular opinion, military officers have been involved in civic action and political matters since the founding of the Republic. Before 1815, officers managed the negotiation of treaties and US missions abroad, taught in frontier schools and, of course, ran the Army Corps of Engineers. Later, with the acquisition of overseas territories, naval officers entered the political realm. World War I saw officers involved in civilian affairs, while World War II saw officers engaged in diplomacy and civil administration during the German and Japanese occupations, including overseeing the establishment of political parties, labor unions and fledgling economic structures.

Former Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was aware of the political nature of military programs and made his immediate staff responsible for politico-military coordination. This, for example, led to officers becoming involved in fiscal management, research and development, and political analysis, and eventually saw the appointment of an assistant secretary for International Security Affairs and an assistant secretary for Economic Security in the 1990s. While General Douglas MacArthur's speech to the graduating cadets at West Point in 1962 warned them to avoid all things political—perhaps recalling his stormy relationship with President Harry S. Truman—President John F. Kennedy told them just a year later to be aware of the political dimension of their profession. This contrast, indeed, sparked discussion and debate throughout the 1960s at West Point.[14]

Politics is a consideration not only at the national level, but at the international level as well. The fall of communism has not eliminated the necessity of a US presence abroad, especially in terms of PK, limited warfare, counterrevolution and counterterrorism. This includes the use of the US military in advisory and support positions to supplement nation building and internal security in developing nations. Such actions, indeed, are heavily political. The battlefield commander's every move has political ramifications. Thus, even the officer who has spent most of his career in the combat arms must be aware of the international politico-economic dimensions of military action and the fact that limited wars do not bring victory in the traditional sense.

Not only are military leaders considering nonmilitary factors in their deliberations, civilian leaders now expect military advice to be broad in scope. A survey of former members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) confirms that this expectation was generally met during deliberations of that body. Political Scientist William Jesse, who conducted the survey, wrote that many of the military leaders he interviewed were politically sophisticated and shared the same value system with society in general. They had a knowledge of the spirit, as well as the mechanics, of American democracy. They had also had public policy-oriented "adaptive" assignments, which gave them an appreciation for the workings of the political system.[15]

To function effectively in the domestic and international environment, some tactful, constructive professional dissent should be allowed. Otherwise, a reliance on military orthodoxy may harm the very profession that orthodoxy is intended to protect. Responsible skepticism and inquiry are needed at the individual level so that the institution may be subject to constant self-examination.[16]

Reginald Brown writes of the danger of a traditional officer corps that unquestioningly refrains from self-examination and criticism. He recounts the German General Staff's subservience to Adolf Hitler. There, traditional military virtues ultimately led to greater militarism. He sees a parallel in the US entry into Vietnam, when military leaders did not stand up to civilian decision makers. "Civilian militarism can be as reprehensible as that of military men. Traditional military professionalism is not likely to succeed in preventing the rise of militarism, civilian or military."[17] Brown concludes that the new military professional, a political participant, should not feel the need to blindly accept any military policy, but should be more concerned with how he relates to his country than to his service or superior. General Colin Powell's advocacy of clearly stated objectives, overwhelming force and an exit strategy before and during the Gulf War is an example of a military leader nudging political leaders toward sensible and realistic expectations and decisions. The right to dissent and access to political institutions, specifically Congress, are more compatible with contemporary American democracy and its national security interests. Note the JCS approaching Congress in late 1998 to testify about readiness problems, lamenting defense funding shortfalls and floating a military pay raise trial balloon.

Education and the Molding of the Mind

In a study of *operant behavior*—what people do—and *respondent behavior*—what they consciously say they choose to do—David C. McClelland notes: "People carry around with them cognitive schemas that organize their feelings, attitudes, and choices in a particular area such as affiliation or achievement."[18] Obviously, everyone has a particular psychological makeup which, coupled with education, socialization and experience, forms attitudes and values. These, in turn, help determine behavior.

Internationally, few military actions, even at the battlefield level, are without political consequences. The military must be involved in policy making if the state expects it to competently carry out policy directives. For that, civilian liberal arts education, the study of foreign politics and culture and involvement in politics are unavoidable. Even in postwar Germany, Army captains and majors were passed over for promotion or discharged because of deficiencies as managers and educators. The ongoing Bosnian PK operation since dramatically highlights the political, economic, social and cultural components of an officer's role.

Bengt Abrahamson, for example, writes of three stages in an officer's recruitment and promotion. First, there is selection and self-selection. Individuals with active, conservative and authoritarian attitudes appear to predominate among those who seek a commission. Second is the selection process in promotion. Those who conform with superiors' expectations and attitudes obviously are at an advantage. Third come indoctrination processes to ensure homogeneity in values. This is the point at which an officer whose values do not mesh with those of his peers may leave the military. Specifically, Abrahamson finds that professional military indoctrination leads to a pessimistic attitude regarding danger to the state. If an officer adopts this attitude, it contributes to his career success. He concludes that selection plus professional socialization ultimately lead to uniform attitudes among officers at the upper ranks.[19]

Some curricula lend themselves more to the treatment of values than others. Author Philip E. Jacob asserts that "values inhere and are inseparable from the teaching of social science. They are a *subject* of instruction. They are sometimes a specific *motivation* of instruction. They are also a *consequence* of instruction." Some students, though, are not very

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Few would dispute the value of a liberal education for officers or other professionals at the undergraduate level. However, there is also a need for depth of knowledge that can be gained only through advanced, research-oriented study. This is partially provided by the war colleges, senior schools and other institutions of professional military education (PME). But such education is not fully able to prepare an officer for his responsibilities as he advances in rank.

creative in their thought or its consequences for value formation. Jacob notes that "Some students have a set of mind so rigid, an outlook on human relations so stereotyped and a reliance on authority so compulsive that they are intellectually and emotionally incapable of understanding new ideas, and seeing, much less accepting, educational implications which run counter to their pre-conceptions. . . . Such students quail in the presence of conflict and uncertainty. They crave 'right answers.' They distrust speculative thought, their own or their fellow students'. They recoil from 'creative discussion."[20]

Interestingly, Jacob concludes that student values do not change because of the formal educational process or curriculum, but because of the climate of certain institutions, sensitive teachers with value commitments and value-laden personal experiences integrated with intellectual development. Even the hard-core students described above can be affected by a well-ordered syllabus, coupled with a patient instructor who inspires the self-confidence to reason and judge independently.

Further, applied to the military, one study points out the importance of not stopping with a four-year undergraduate degree, at least for West Point officers. After graduation, they tended to be more politically conservative, more inclined to a pragmatic, situation-oriented mode of judgment and less inclined to value academic achievement. Overall, new officers emerging from West Point demonstrated a practical realism over theoretical values and had adopted values similar to those of their instructors. Cadets who failed to receive a commission took with them values similar to society in general.[21]

If a significant number of officers have such attitudes, what can the Army do, considering that mental processes must be endlessly changed because of the flux in the professional officer's role? The answer consists in an officer's broad educational background at all levels. Even at the undergraduate level, Reserve Officers' Training Corp officers from various universities bring a diversity and depth of educational background to the officer corps, as opposed to the more uniform West Point cadets. A number of observers have stressed the importance of a liberal arts education for the well-developed officer. Medal of Honor recipient Admiral James Stockdale proposes a return to the historical and philosophical classics, which would provide wisdom and perspective to tackle contemporary problems. Leaders need to possess integrity, discipline and a philosophical bent not available from the modern management literature. Socrates, Mill, Dostoyevsky and Koestler are among the authors Stockdale recommends to develop the principles of "right, good, honor, duty, freedom, necessity, law and justice as they apply to the human predicament generally and to the role of the leader in particular." Finally, he notes that philosophy "gives perspective to the problems of the present and drives home the point that there is really very little new under the sun." Samuel P. Huntington also advocates the study of liberal arts for the officer: "The fact that, like the lawyer and the physician, he is continuously dealing with human beings requires him to have the deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations and behavior which a liberal education stimulates. Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine, it is now also almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer."[22]

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individual differences among the officer-students, for it inculcates common perceptions of the profession, as well as professional solidarity. Others have found PME to be a very stimulating experience with no pressures to conform their views to others.

Theodore J. Crackel notes that the specialist ordered to a war college is forced to become a generalist, considering foreign affairs, national interests and civil-military relations. The problem at the service colleges is that frequent curriculum changes prevent a high level of sophistication in instruction or faculty. There is little opportunity for in-depth thought and development of ideas among faculty and students. The senior service schools also possess few distinguished scholars, perhaps because of a systematic discouragement of thinkers in uniform. "If Clausewitz and Jomini had served in the American military, they would have been counseled to serve no more than a single three-year teaching assignment, and to escape sooner if possible. The schools are now anything but a safe haven for the select few who should be allowed to turn gray thinking and recording profound thoughts about their profession."[24] Former JCS Chairman General David Jones laments that such officers retire as lieutenant colonels and go to think tanks.

Civilian Graduate Education for Officers

The most appropriate place for such outstanding individuals is full-time civilian graduate education in the liberal arts. There are, of course, outstanding officers with bachelor's degrees. Others pursue masters and doctorates part-time while off-duty. However, for an officer to derive full benefits from graduate study, it must be pursued full-time at a civilian university. Research-oriented civilian graduate education engenders a flexibility in thought supported by three pillars:

- The technical component teaches scientific and management skills.
- The critical component instills judgment about the priorities and trade-offs among resources and values.
- Officers are able to assess the values and attitudes that the nation wants them to hold.[25]

This third pillar deserves special mention, for officers must go beyond purely military thoughts. Every professional—military or civilian—must have an intellectual awareness of the world outside his profession. The military professional must have the intellectual sensitivity to assess the use of force, policy outcomes and the domestic and international environment. As Masland and Radway note, "high-level command and policy-making responsibilities are not those for which a neatly packaged bundle of requirements can be determined and assembled. They call for the broadest sort of intellectual and personal qualities."[26]

Professional military education—from West Point to the senior schools and war colleges—is not sufficient to develop officers cognitively able to deal with these new nonmilitary tasks without compromising military professionalism. The depth of insight and inquiry needed is best found in civilian liberal arts graduate education, in contrast to technical and scientific graduate degrees. Although traditionalists may contend that graduate school detracts from professionalism, such study enhances the profession and enables the officer to better carry out long-term military obligations.

Certainly not all have embraced the merits of civilian liberal arts graduate education for professional officers. Antimilitary critics want to keep officers out of civilian institutions, isolating the military from society. Military traditionalists fear the loss of a sense of duty in civilian study. At best, such study is perceived as "nice to have," but not relevant to the combat arms. This attitude, though, ignores the benefits to both soldier and service. Certainly, the military and the university have different viewpoints, purposes and professional commitments. Further, the university offers a diversity of behavior and views. But those factors are particularly useful. The officer who brings relative maturity and experience to the classroom becomes an object of examination, which can help correct misconceptions among students and faculty about the military. The university sees that officers are not warmongers but serious and thoughtful students who bring valuable insights to the classroom. Likewise, officers see that all university people are not leftists or radicals.

In such an environment, the officer is better able to evaluate the military institution—and the political system itself. Social issues, human behavior, morality and philosophy are now a part of discussion. Alternative sources of information and influence are available, resulting in a greater dynamism within the military upon the officer's completion of graduate studies. Civilian graduate education thus becomes important for professional dimensions while also establishing closer ties with society. Indeed, the better understanding of the military profession resulting from graduate study is the best

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starting point for upgrading the profession. This would not happen at the service schools or war colleges. The profession is open to improvement because of this development of individual officers. Some find the experience rewarding, while others renew their commitment to the orderly world of military life. Some become so dissatisfied with the military and its intellectual constraints that they resign—the military can no longer fulfill their expectations. Most remain committed to change the institution for the better.[27]

Studies indicate that most professionals feel civilian graduate education makes them more competent, competitive and effective. They have a greater sense of satisfaction and achievement and their promotion and retention rates are enhanced. They are well prepared for the more challenging assignments required of senior officers in the international environment.

Many analysts who support civilian graduate education for professional officers maintain that such validated positions must be geared specifically to military requirements, needs of trained personnel and the demand for their subsequent services. In other words, the program should be geared to meet personnel needs, not the educational level of individual officers. Indeed, current regulations support this view. The Army's Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) program allows officers to pursue graduate degrees in disciplines that have validated branch, functional area or specialty requirements. After obtaining a graduate degree, the officer must complete a three-year tour in a validated position under the Army Education Requirements System. On average, officers spend 18 months in school, incurring an obligation that must be repaid on a three-for-one basis—three days active duty for every day of schooling. They also incur an active duty service obligation of up to six years.[28]

Specifically addressing the Navy's graduate program, Edward H. Monroe writes: "Above all, programs requested should be based upon qualifications, eligibility and background. The Navy's goal is to provide the best possible specialists and subspecialists to fill defined requirements; not merely to grant graduate education as a reward for past performance or as a career incentive." Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown are not as dogmatic but still look primarily at military requirements: "Civilian graduate education should be retained as much for the integrative effects of exposure to civilian elite groups as for the academic discipline. It should be possible, however, to focus on those disciplines which are most relevant to the combat Army." Specifically addressing the Marine Corps, particularly since Commandant P.X. Kelley's tenure, graduate studies have not blended well with the Corps' preparation for warfighting. It would be advantageous for the career-minded officer to focus on field performance and PME rather than nonmilitary education.[29]

Others, however, criticize the stipulation that civilian liberal arts graduate education be geared toward military requirements, claiming that policy overlooks the program's long-term value. The military's interests are served when the intellectual level of individual officers is raised. Such observers assert that civilian graduate education should be an integral part of officer education for all who academically qualify. This would help avoid "ticket punching" and eliminate the distinction between education and training. The officer returning to duty following graduate study brings with him a healthy skepticism of the norms and expectations of the military profession. This new attitude can make the military more progressive, dynamic and acceptable to the society it serves. Officers with graduate liberal arts degrees tend to be less absolutist, less likely to have a myopic view of politics, have a deeper understanding of ends-means relationships in policy issues, be more open to society's socio-political values, have higher professional ideals and feel a greater commitment to their military careers.[30]

One of the most important findings of Fred Bryant's analysis of officers is that receiving a civilian graduate education appears to alter officers' beliefs in certain ways. Specifically, such officers give a lower national priority to activist military policies than do officers just beginning graduate

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school or older majors without graduate degrees. Evidently, those who seek an advanced degree are not different in these terms initially, but rather come to see counterinsurgency, military commitment abroad, increasing nuclear capability and reinstating the draft as having a lower national priority only after completing civilian graduate studies. Again addressing the Navy, specifically the Ph.D. degree, Norman E. Hoehler writes: "The line officer is the personification of the Navy's ability to meet its national defense objectives. Does the line officer, then, need a Ph.D. degree to fulfill his role within the organization? The answer is no. Is the total organization more effective, however, as a result of the intellectual potential he represents? According to the study, yes."[31]

While those who study the impact of civilian graduate education on military officers agree that it improves both individuals and the military institution, a perception persists that the program somehow diminishes military expertise and professionalism. Indeed, the question would not arise if graduate study were an accepted component of an officer's education. The final barrier, this reaction against intellectual sophistication, has yet to be surmounted.

If the military is to function in the international and domestic socio-political environments with their diverse and complex challenges, officers must be prepared in a way that cannot be accomplished solely by PME. Civilian liberal arts study gives an officer the best perspective from which to serve his client—the nation and the society it represents: "The educated military man, skilled in his own profession, and unafraid to commit himself to higher principles, provides the best safeguard to civilian control and a democratic system."[32]

The need to have a socially and politically sophisticated military has presented a challenge to the officer corps in terms of dealing with policy making, civilian perceptions of the military and vice versa. Traditionalists, in the Huntington mold, continue to call for the isolation of the military to

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preserve martial purity in the unconditional service of the state. More appropriate today, however, is the military's embrace of political understanding and expertise, a realistic and enlightened self-interest and professional perspectives enhancing "Duty, Honor, Country." An officer without this mind-set is in trouble.

There is little doubt, whether traditionalists like it or not, that it is impossible to maintain a rigid and narrow professionalism, which has been rejected by the nation's political and military leaders for 50 years. Internally, the military has been forced to adapt to social changes since the 1960s. The gays in the military debate of 1993 and1994, and continuing court challenges, are just the latest chapter in this continuum. As organizational forms and social demands have grown more complex, military authority has become less arbitrary, authoritarian and direct. Informal, interactive processes have modified formal military authority structures.

Externally, in the domestic political environment, both civilians and military professionals have recognized the need to have the military involved in the policy process: "With the traditions of obedience to civilian control strong within the military, with an appreciation by military leaders of the spirit of the democratic system, and with competent civilian superiors determined to exercise effective civilian control, the costs of a broadened military professionalism do not appear too high. The benefits of military advice given after a consideration of all relevant factors should contribute to more enlightened national security policy."[33]

The military has been dissatisfied with its status and influence in society and has desired a voice in policies that impact it. There has been concern over careerism, professional ethics, institutional demands and individual values. Rather than retreat back to the barracks, the military must address these problems head-on, recognizing its social and political calling in peacetime. It is possible to retain military identity while participating in civic action, peaceful uses of military force and policy making. Far from diluting professionalism, these roles enhance it.

Internationally, few military actions, even at the battlefield level, are without political consequences. The military must be involved in policy making if the state expects it to competently carry out policy directives. For that, civilian liberal arts education, the study of foreign politics and culture and involvement in politics are unavoidable. Even in postwar Germany, Army captains and majors were passed over for promotion or discharged because of deficiencies as managers and educators.[34] The ongoing Bosnian PK operation since dramatically highlights the political, economic, social and cultural components of an officer's role.

Of course, the military cannot be a carbon copy of society. It must stand apart to maintain professionalism, cohesion and competence. Though involved in politics and peaceful social action, the military will always be in the business of engaging the enemy. Nevertheless, a dynamic professionalism with the ability to argue positions with sophistication and maturity in the highest intellectual tradition will best position the military in the socio-political milieu. This calls for constant self-examination and debate over what constitutes legitimate political and social activity for the officer corps. There cannot be a reliance on past glories and institutional inertia—the military must develop imaginative and innovative concepts for the future. Witness the current debates on Force XXI, the Army After Next and Rapid Dominance, where the approach used in the Persian Gulf is being questioned. Mental processes are needed which cannot be added to operational orders. Because the military profession rewards orthodoxy, civilian graduate education must be a weapon in the institution's arsenal.

The key question is whether civilian graduate education can be institutionalized in the US military system as it enters the 21st century. Except for certain West Point instructors, military intelligence, public affairs and foreign area officers, fully funded civilian liberal arts graduate study does not fit into the Army's paradigm for success. Career patterns, for instance in the infantry, do not include graduate school, and the combat arms received no graduate school slots in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998. Exceptional officers are always in high demand and it is difficult to extricate them for full-time graduate study. Further, prevailing Army attitudes can easily resocialize returning officers, thus obviating the effect of their education. Sorg and Bryant note that officers with technical graduate degrees felt that

their studies were more relevant to the Army than social science graduates did, and the former were more likely to think that social science graduates were not useful to the Army. There are almost 5,400 positions designated for commissioned and warrant officers holding graduate degrees or who have participated in the Training With Industry program, but most of these designated positions are not for liberal arts degrees. Under ACS for FY 98, there were only 100 nontechnical graduate school slots authorized out of a total of 427 funded slots and only five funded Ph.D. slots.[35] Combat arms officers were unsure of the relevance of civilian graduate education to their Army service. Ticket punching was another negative manifestation. Although most officers were pleased with their graduate school interlude, attitudes toward it were ambivalent.

On the other hand, Bryant identifies sets of differences that do emerge regarding career enhancement and activist military policies. Of course, officers seeking ACS are already different from their fellow officers to begin with, but certain beliefs are also affected by civilian education. Further, when considering Army policy, there seems to be a long-term trend away from the notion of graduate study for the purpose of fulfilling certain requirements for the payback tour, and some movement toward an attitude accepting the development of well-rounded officers. Indeed, when individuals who have received fully funded graduate degrees *and* possess the latter mind-set become general officers, the notion of individual development may truly take hold within the military. Officers do not need Ph.D.s in political science to fire pistols or perform most of their duties. They do, however, contribute more overall because of their intellectual skills. The officer corps is, after all, supposed to be the introduction of enlightened professionalism into the business of managing violence.

For Further Study

To more fully understand the link between civilian liberal arts graduate education and officers' perceptions of military professionalism, several questions need further research to refine the military's policy on this issue and the rightful place of advanced study in an officer's development.

First, it may be useful to speak with the commanders of those officers returning to the military. Do these payback tour commanders feel that officers possessing master's and doctoral degrees perform better? Are they more flexible and adaptive in their thinking? Do they enhance unit performance? Are they more broad-minded in their decision making and implementation? Are they less dogmatic? Do they take nonmilitary factors into account when assessing means-ends relationships? Is there actually a payoff during the payback?

A military executive must possess a wide range of knowledge and be able to absorb new data and concepts quickly. Also, he leads his charges mainly through patience and intellectual leadership. Persuasion, not orders, is seen as the best motivational strategy. Finally, a contemporary officer obeys his civilian superiors and brings his best judgment as a military expert to bear on civilian policy decisions.

Second, the ACS population at civilian graduate schools ranges from 800 to 1,000 officers at any given time. The utility of student detachments at civilian graduate institutions must be more fully considered. Do they negate the positive aspects of civilian study? Do they prevent meaningful integration into the civilian student milieu? Would it be wiser to send officer-students to institutions by themselves? Would that be beneficial to both the officer and the institution? Would it allow for meaningful and more permanent value changes that could withstand the return to full-time military service?

Third, a large-scale policy of civilian liberal arts graduate education immediately following commissioning should be investigated. On average, officers selected for ACS attend graduate school as branch-qualified captains between their sixth and eighth year of service and are Combined Arms and Services Staff School graduates. Is it beneficial to concentrate on young lieutenants, or does civilian graduate education after a few years of operational experience provide officers an opportunity to reflect on their past real-life experiences and impart a more sophisticated understanding of the use of their knowledge for future career experiences? Sorg's analysis appears to indicate that a relatively brief exposure to civilian graduate education at the seven-year mark in an officer's career does not have a profound effect on his basic attitudes. By then the military mind is well formed. Particularly resistant to change are the core values related to perceptions of military professionalism. Examining the survey results, Bryant reaches a similar conclusion that civilian graduate education does not profoundly alter the values and beliefs of captains and majors. Perhaps the solution to this problem is starting civilian graduate education earlier. Is there a long-term and

sustained difference in both values and performance as an officer? Does it detract from the development of an officer's traditional martial virtues or from military professionalism, both actual and perceived?

Fourth, the problem of resocialization constantly emerges throughout surveys and analyses. Is the overall civilian graduate experience rendered meaningless upon returning to military life? Are attitudes toward the experience changing? Will they be markedly different a decade from now? Will the experience be viewed in light of individual development or specific requirements? Will the experience be used in positive ways in an officer's policy-making and implementation activities? Is the problem of resocialization insurmountable or is it just a matter of time?

Fifth, other options and developments need to be investigated. How has PME sought to emulate civilian graduate education? How has it tackled social, political, economic and cultural issues?

These are important issues which must be addressed to gain a better understanding of military professionalism—past, present and future. There must be a better definition of the meaning of civilian graduate education for the individual officer, for the officer corps and for the military as an institution. Ironically, if the military profession does not go outside itself, martial virtues themselves may wither, resulting in diminished professionalism. ***MR***

NOTES

1. *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Fred B. Bryant (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
2. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 3.
3. Morris Janowitz, "Civic Consciousness and Military Performance," in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), 76.
4. Seminal writings here are, *inter alia*, Sam C. Sarkesian and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Case for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1975), 256-57; John Robert Beishline, *Military Management for National Defense* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950). At the time of its writing, Beishline was a colonel on the Army's General Staff Corps and held a Ph.D. The book's contents reveal a treatment of military management *par excellence*, dealing with management philosophy, planning and organization; Louis C. Seelig, *Resource Management in Peace and War* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1990), 19 ff.; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage, 1957), 13; Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 129.
5. For the role of science and technology in the postwar military and professional officer corps, see Harold F. Clark and Harold S. Sloan, *Classrooms in the Military: An Account of Education in the Armed Forces of the United States* (New York: Institute for Instructional Improvement, Columbia University, 1964), 142-43. See also Edwin Mansfield, ed., *Defense, Science, and Public Policy* (New York: Norton, 1968).
6. Masland and Radway, 30-46.
7. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Managers and Gladiators: Directions of Change in the Army* (np: Hawkes Press, 1977), 6.
8. Paul R. Savage, "Dimensions of Careerism in Military Organizations," in Gabriel and Savage, 50-51.
9. James C. Shelburne and Kenneth J. Groves, *Education in the Armed Forces* (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1965), 81, 90-91; William E. Turcotte, "Leadership v. Management," in Taylor and Rosenbach, 105-9; Taylor and Rosenbach, 76.
10. Sam C. Sarkesian and Thomas M. Gannon, "Professionalism: Problems and Challenges," *American Behavioral Scientist* (May-June 1976), 503-4; Gabriel and Savage, 5 and 6. See also Sam C. Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975), 46-48.
11. John W. Gardner, "The Antileadership Vaccine," in Taylor and Rosenbach, 186.
12. Masland and Radway, 519-26. See also 513-518.
13. Amos A. Jordan Jr., "Officer Education," in *Handbook of Military Institutions*, ed. Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1971), 212. See also Jordan and William J. Taylor Jr. "The Military Man in Academia," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 1973), 130-31 for a summary of postwar military professionalism.
14. Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, *Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 25; see also 29.
15. William Leyda Jesse, *The New Military Professional: Changing Conceptions of Military Professionalism in the Post War Period*, University of California at Riverside, Ph.D. dissertation, political science, 1972, 134-47.
16. Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer*, 28-36, 77-78, 208-211, 230-31; Sarkesian and Gannon, 501-2.
17. Reginald J. Brown, "The Meaning of Professionalism," *American Behavioral Scientist* (May-June 1976), 519; see also 515-16.
18. David C. McClelland, "How Motives, Skills, and Values Determine What People Do," *American Psychologist* (July 1985), 823.
19. Bengt Abrahamson, "Military Professionalization and Estimates on the Probability of War," in *Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts*, ed. Jacques van Doorn (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1969), 35-51.
20. Philip E. Jacob, *Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), xiii, 10. Jacob's emphasis. See also 11.
21. Robert Priest, Terrence Fullerton, and Claude Bridges, "Personality and Value Changes in West Point Cadets," *Armed Forces and Society* (Summer 1982), 639-40. See also Richard P. Butler, Charles L. Larden and John B. Miner, "A Motivational Basis for Turnover in Military Officer Education and Training," *Journal of Applied Psychology* (August 1983), 496-97, 505.
22. James Stockdale, "Educating Leaders," in Taylor and Rosenbach. See, in, general, 66-70; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 14.
23. See Clark and Sloan, 86-87 for a brief overview of resident civilian undergraduate opportunities afforded military personnel. Henry C. Herge et al., discuss World War II-era college training programs for military personnel in science, economics and other disciplines. See their *Wartime College Training Programs of the Armed Services* (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1948). Robert John Matthew writes of the value of World War II language and area studies training. This included study at Columbia, Princeton and the University of Chicago. See his *Language and Area Studies in the Armed Services: Their Future Significance* (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1947).
24. Theodore J. Crackel, "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels," *The Public Interest* (Summer 1984), 26.
25. William J. Taylor Jr., "Alternative Proposals for Fully Funded Graduate Education on Civilian Campuses," in *The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S.*, ed. Lawrence J. Korb (Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1976), 164.
26. Masland and Radway, 507.
27. Masland and Radway, 305; Sarkesian, *The Professional Army Officer*, 125-31; Sarkesian and Taylor, 255-56, 259.
28. The author acknowledges Jim Tice of *Army Times*, who reports on officer education issues for the information on current Army policies and statistics in this article.
29. Edward H. Monroe Jr., "Postgraduate Studies," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (March 1973), 108; Zeb B. Bradford Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, *The United States Army in Transition* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973), 230; Stein, 71.
30. William J. Taylor Jr. and Donald F. Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Fall 1974). The same issue of the *Journal*, 269-71, contains Franklin D. Margiotta's "A Comment on Taylor and Bletz's 'A Case for Officer Graduate Education': How Much Is Enough?" For an early study of officers' attitudes toward their graduate studies, see Thomas L. Brewer, "The Impact of Advanced Education on American Military Officers," *Armed Forces and Society* (Fall 1975), 63-80.
31. Norman E. Hoehler III, "The Unrestricted Line PhD: An Assessment," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (February 1974), 110. Regarding the Ph.D., see also Burton I. Edelson, "The Ph.D. in Uniform," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 1966), *inter alia* 73, 77. Masland and Radway, 305, point out that one of the first postwar military officers to earn a Ph.D. in international relations, Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, was appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as White House staff secretary in 1954.
32. Sam C. Sarkesian, *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism* (New York: Pergamon, 1981), 189.
33. Sarkesian and Gannon, 500-501; Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (March 1959), 473; Jesse, 151.
34. Rudolph Schwartz, *Non-Military Education in the United States Army and Air Force, 1900-1960*, New York University, Ed.D. dissertation, education, 1963, 227-28.
35. Since the drawdown, the Army has been more cost-conscious about ACS. The FY 1998 funding level for the program was $8.1 million. Officers must choose from a list of approved schools. Two-thirds of ACS officers attend low-cost schools—those with annual tuition less than $14,500.

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